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Research Report No. 3

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THE NATIVE PROBLEM IN NORTH AFRICA

January 6, 1942

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THE NATIVE PROBLEM IN NORTH AFRICA

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CONFIDENTIAL

Near East Section
Research Report No. 3
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THE NATIVE PROBLEM IN NORTH AFRICA

I. ANALYSIS OF THE NATIVE POPULATION

A. Census

1. Morocco: No absolutely reliable figures are available, owing to the difficulties involved in tabulating a people who are partly nomadic and partly mountaineers inhabiting regions difficult of access. The latest available estimate[1] was made in 1936 and gives the following figures:

TABLE I

FRENCH ZONE	CIVIL POPULATION
Non-Moroccan	
French	
Citizens	139,131
Subjects, protégés	16,438
Total French	155,569
Other foreigners	50,937
TOTAL Non-Moroccans	206,506
Moroccan	
Muslim	5,874,888
Jews	161,312
TOTAL Moroccan native population	6,036,200

General total of all civilian inhabitants: 6,242,706

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[1] *Annuaire Statistique*, Vol. 54, (Paris, 1939), 1938.

TABLE II

FRENCH ZONE MILITARY POPULATION

Non-Moroccan	
French	
Citizens	15,111
Subjects, protégés	6,369
Total French	21,480
Other foreigners	8,616
TOTAL Non-Moroccans	30,096
Moroccan	
Muslim	23,334
General total of military population:	53,430
General total of civil population:	6,242,706
GRAND TOTAL	6,296,136

Another breakdown gives the following data:[2] *French Zone*: British subjects, 1,892; urban population, 983,946, of whom 821,628 are native Moroccans. *Spanish Zone*: total 1936 estimate, 795,297. Of these, Muslims about 738,000; Europeans, 44,379; Jews, 12,918. *Tangier*: total 1939 estimate 60,000, of which native Muslims, 40,000; native Jews, 8,000; Europeans, 12,000. Of the Europeans in Tangier, the great majority were Spaniards, but the better-class mercantile population was largely French. The total population of the three areas was, therefore, about 7,151,433, of which number at least 212,513 were Europeans, leaving 6,938,920 natives. The native population is now probably somewhat over 7,000,000.

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[2] Cf. *Isis*, November 1940, pp. 31 ff.

2. Tunisia: The total population of Tunisia has been recently estimated at between 2,650,000 and 2,700,000.[3] In 1936 out of a grand total of 2,608,313, there were 2,335,623 native Muslims; 59,485 Jews; 108,068 French; 94,289 Italians; 7,279 Maltese; 323 Spaniards; 454 Greeks; and 2,792 other foreigners.[4] In 1926, out of a total population of 2,159,708, there were 1,932,184 Muslims; 54,243 native Jews. Of 173,281 Europeans, 71,020 were French (41%); 89,216 Italian (51.5%); 8,396 Anglo-Maltese; and 4,649 others. Most of the Italians are from Sicily and Sardinai and are miners, masons, agricultural workers, and small vinyardists. The French are mostly civil officials, merchants, and large-scale colonists. A few are small-scale colonists and peasants.[5]

3. Algeria:

TABLE III

POPULATION IN 1936

French (including naturalized Jews)	819,455
French subjects (including Arabs, Kabyls, Mzabs, Mzab Jews)	6,160,176
Foreigners	
Tunisians	2,542
Moroccans	36,825
Spaniards	92,377
Italians	21,009
Others	14,233
Total population of municipal areas	7,147,157
Others	87,527
GRAND TOTAL	7,234,684

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[3] *al-saʿādah* (Rabat), April 9, 1941, p. 1

[4] *Annuaire Statistique*, 1938, p. 270.

[5] *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, article "Tunisie"; A. Girault, *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*, V (Paris, 1928), p. 16.

Northern Algeria had 6,592,033 inhabitants, while southern Algeria (the Sahara) had 642,651. The European municipal population was 939, 531, including 213,372 French by nationality (725,830 French by origin), and 126,159 others.[6] The agricultural crisis of 1931-36 was responsible for a drift of both natives and Europeans to the cities, resulting in a falling off of the rural population.

B. Population by "Race"

The Berbers are the aboriginal Hamitic inhabitants of North Africa; they have mixed with the Semitic Arab conquerors of the seventh, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth, and fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries to form the basic population of today. In all regions of North Africa more or less pure Berber and Arab groups are found, but the majority of the natives are a mixture of both, being either Berberized Arabs or Arabized Berbers. The constitution of many of the great tribes is unclear and their origin unknown. The degrees of Arabization *decreases* from east to west. Of all French North Africa, Tunisia is the most strongly Arabized, while Morocco is a Berber country penetrated by Arabs.

In practice, the term "Arab" is used also of Berbers who have become linguistically, culturally, and religiously assimilated to the Arab invaders. But it is hard to draw a hard and fast line between the two. There are large numbers of bi-lingual Berbers, and though nominally Muslims, a large part of the Berber population still retains much of its pagan heritage. The best criteria for distinguishing Berbers from Arabs are:

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[6] *L'Afrique francaise*, 48 (1938), 147ff; cf. *Annuaire Statistique*, p. 259. Where the French by nationally are given as 819,455, French by origin, 731,499, naturalized French, 87,956, and foreigners, 166,986.

- a. (Muslim) Berbers still retain a code of profane law based on Berber usage along with Muslim religious law.
- b. Berber political life includes a "democratic" class and small municipal governments with a council (usually of elders), in contrast to the aristocratic system of the Arabs in Morocco.
- c. Berber Muslim women, in distinction to the Arab Muslim women, go unveiled. The Berbers are monogamous. In some tribes (e.g. the Tuareg), definite traces of matriarchy survive.
- d. Arabization has been chiefly a linguistic and religious rather than an ethnic process.

1. Morocco
    - a. *Berbers*: Including Berber-speaking and bi-linguals, estimated at forty per cent of the population.[7]
    - b. *Arabs*: Arabic was an exclusively "city language" in Morocco until the thirteenth century. Its use has spread until today the lower-lying, more productive lands and the cities are generally inhabited by Arabic speakers. Mountain regions which are closely linked to urban centers also tend to speak Arabic and to be culturally Arabized.
    - c. *Jews:* The total number of Jews in French and Spanish Morocco and Tangier is about 182,230. This does not take into account those registered in the census as French citizens or protégés. They speak *their own brand* of the local Arabic. There are two principal Jewish elements:

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[7] Vidal de la Blache et Gallois, *Géographie Universelle*, XI, 72. See also, Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, *French Morocco*, London, 1920, pp. 9-12.

(1) Plichtim (Palestinians), originally from Palestine and now largely augmented by Judaized Berbers. These are found among tribes in the Atlas Mountains, as well as in cities.

(2) Forasteros (Spanish and Portuguese Jews), refugees in Morocco since the sixteenth century; now found chiefly in coastal cities. They speak archaic Spanish and Portuguese.

d. *Negroes*: Negro blood is found in a large portion of the population. It does not create any particular social barrier.

(1) South of the Atlas Mountains, Berber-Negro intermarriage has created the groups known as the Ḥaraṭīn.[8]

(2) Further north, slave marriage has introduced a substantial amount of Negro blood into bourgeois circles.

(3) Sudanese Negroes, always the most esteemed mercenaries in Morocco, have entered the country in a small but steady stream.

2. Tunisia

The Arab element dominates the northern and eastern coastal regions, while the Berbers are strongest in the Sahara region of the South. The plain of Bizerta is inhabited by truck farmers and gardeners descended from the Spanish Moors and still called Andalus (from Andalusia). Among the foreign Muslims, Algerians and people from the South (Sahara) are most numerous.[9] The non-urban native population is divided between oasis dwellers and nomad Bedouins,[10] but there is a distinct tendency for the latter to settle down on the land. Of the Jews, several thousand of European origin have retained their Italian nationality (1930). The others remain subjects of the Bey, governed by native law except in personal matters, which are referred to a rabbinical court and Jewish "notaires" (*ʿadl*, pl. *ʿudūl*). They are not generally admitted as civil servants, and are not obliged to take up military service. They have tended to become Europeanized more rapidly than the Muslims; among the naturalized "neo-French" there were in 1930 fewer than 2,000 Muslims, but about 5,000 Jews.[11] Of Negroes, no statistics are at hand.

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[8] See Robert Montagne, *Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le sud de Maroc*, Paris, 1930

3. Algeria

As in the rest of North Africa, the population is very mixed, but the following are the basic components:[12]

- a. Aboriginal Berbers
- b. Arabs
- c. Moors (*Ḥaḍar*), descended from old urban population (Punic, Roman, Byzantine, etc.) fortified by

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[9] Vidal de la Blache et Gallois, *op. cit.*, XI, 231, 238.
[10] *Bulletin d'information de Quinzaine de Tunisie*, No. 3, Feb., 1941.
[11] *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, art. "Tunisie", p. 900.
[12] *Ibid.*, art. "Algerie."

Spanish Muslim and Jewish emigres in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth century and by European renegades in the sixteenth and seventeenth century.

d. Quloghlus, descendants of Turks and native women.

e. Turks remaining after 1830.

f. Negroes: slaves or descendants thereof. They are found in several cities of the Tell and in the oases in the south.[13] The city population, which for centuries has occupied the coastal towns, is different from that of the tribal villages.

g. The city people are a bourgeoisie of traders and litterateurs, peaceful and easy-going, to which has been added since the French conquest in 1830 a proletariat of journalists and workmen who are apt to adopt Western customs. The villages, on the other hand, are occupied by the Kabyles (Ar. *Qabīlah*) or tribesmen, and the fellahin.

h. The nomad element contains groups which wander over the comparatively restricted plain, and those which migrate in the winter far south into the Sahara. Their society is patriarchal. Polygamy is not generally practised for reasons of economy.[14]

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[13] Maestracci, *L'empire colonial francais contemporain*, p. 26.

[14] *Encyclopédie de l'Islām*, art. "Algérie."

i. Jews: In 1936 the naturalized Jewish population was 73,967, but this does not include the Mzab Jews.[15] Since 1725 distinction has been made between the native and Frankish Jews. The former include Spanish Jews, who first arrived in 1391, but most came in the sixteenth century. The Frankish Jews are principally from Italy, especially Livorno and, under foreign protection, have grown wealthy in commerce and banking. Their control of the government led to a reaction at Algiers in 1805, in which many were plundered, massacred, or exiled.[16] Violent anti-Jewish riots took place in 1934. The whole Algerian Jewish community was granted French citizenship in 1870, by the so-called Loi Crémieux at a time when the French needed Jewish support in the Franco-Prussian war. This law was repealed in 1940 by the Vichy government. The political rights of the Algerian Jews are now the same as those of the Muslims, although they retain their civil rights.[17]

C. Population Classified by Language

1. Morocco

a. Arabic: the official language (together with French). The spoken Arabic of Morocco is a dialect not easily understood by Arabs from the eastern Mediterranean. The written language, however, is practically uniform throughout the Arab world, a fact which facilitates the spread of ideas to the more remote Arab regions. Moroccan Arabic has four main dialects:

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[15] *Annuaire Statistique* (1938), p. 259.

[16] *Encyclopédie de l'Islām*, art. "Algérie."

[17] *Isis*, on Algeria, February, 1941, p. 9-10

(1) City Arabic

(2) Nomad Arabic; shows the greatest degree of Berberization

(3) Highland Arabic

(4) Jewish Arabic, written in Hebrew characters. Hebrew is not a living tongue in Morocco.

b. Berber: The general dialectical division of Morocco is into North and South Berber, with the Atlas Mountains as the boundary. There is a considerable written literature (of Muslim religious works). Berber folk literature has a vigorous oral existence. Moroccan radio broadcasts designed for Berber listeners are conducted in the Shilluh dialect.

c. French: French has been acquired by both Berbers and Arabs in two principal ways: by attendance at government schools or by service in the army. However, the figures for the number of French speakers among Berbers and Arabs are not available; it is doubtful if any such tabulation has ever been made.

d. Spanish and Portuguese, spoken by Jews of coastal cities.

2. Tunisia

The classical Arabic is not understood by the masses, who speak a colloquial spoken dialect called Berberiyan. This is true of Algeria also. The Arabic of Tunisia, of all the Maghrib dialects, is closest to the classical in consonantism and has penetrated the country to a greater degree than in either Algeria or Morocco. Classical Arabic is used only in writing and formal discourse. Berber is spoken only by some of the natives at Sened, in the qā'idate (Fr. *caïdat*) of Gafsa, at Tamazred, among the Maṭmāṭah, and on the island of Jerba, and especially among the women. Judaeo-Arabic is apparently dying out in Tunisia.[18]

3. Algeria

In 1937[19] it was estimated that thirty per cent of the natives were Berber speaking, the rest of the country being dominated by Arabic. The Jews speak their own dialect of Arabic, that of Algiers being the best known.

D. Population classified according to religion

1. Morocco

About ninety-four per cent of the total population of French and Spanish Morocco and Tangier is Muslim; Jews are less than four per cent. The vast majority of the Christians are Roman

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[18] *Encyclopédie de l'Islām*, art. "Tunisie."

[19] Vidal de la Blache and Gallois, *op. cit.*, XI, 72.

Catholic (French and Spanish). Moroccan Islam deserves special mention. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw a Muslim revival in northwest Africa as a reaction against the encroachments of Christian Portugal and Spain. "This renaissance of Islam...., the results of which are still to be felt at the present day, is beyond question the great event in the History of Morocco since the Idrisid period."[20] On a foundation of mystic Muslim teachings and Berber traditional practise the movement issued in an era of daring personal leadership by "warrior saints," founders of a successive Sharifian dynasties.

Theologically, Moroccan Islam is rigidly orthodox. Morocco still maintains some sort of a reputation as a focus of conservative Muslim legalism, which dates from before the downfall of Islam in Spain. In the later Middle Ages Morocco was the place where the culture of Spanish Islam was preserved, or rather embalmed, for it has remained static down to the present day. The principal center of theological studies is the college of the Qarawīyīn (Qayrawānians) in Fez (Ar. *Fās*), which is also an important source of Moroccan nationalistic ideology.[21]

The Islam of a considerable part of the Berber population is quite different from the orthodoxy of the town

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[20] *Encyclopaedia of Islām*, III, 585, col. 2; see also, Montagne, *op. cit.*, pp.48-50.
[21] F. H. Mellor, *Morocco Awakes*, pp. 196 and 240.

Arabs. The Berbers have retained much superstition and magic from their pagan past and are often Muslims in name only. This is true especially of the women. The cult of local saints (Marabouts) plays a large role in popular Berber religion and among the less sophisticated Arabs as well. The importance of local saints was increased by the *motif* of personal leadership in Sharīfian history.

2. Tunisia and Algeria

Aside from the minorities of Jews and Christians, of whom the latter are practically all Europeans, there are no other important religious groups in North Africa except Sunni Muslims. The Mālikite rite, one of the four rites of orthodox Islam, prevails throughout French North Africa and is one of the causes of its cultural backwardness. In Tunisia, there are a few Khārijites, remnants of an anti-Arab sect which was widespread among the Berbers in the eighth century. They are found especially among the Berbers of the island of Jerba. Among the Mzab Berbers of Algeria a few ʻAbadis have survived.[22] As in Morocco, in Tunisia also, Islam in its conservativeness carries on the heritage of the Moorish refugees from Spain after the Reconquista, and still prides itself on being the bearer of Andalusian culture. Its chief center is Kairawan (Ar. al-Qayrawān), which occupies the same exalted position as the Qarawīyīn (college of the Kairawanians) at Fez in French Morocco.

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[22] Encyclopaedia of Islām, art. "Algérie."

The popular religion of the Berbers really is Maraboutism, or the cult of local saints, which the Muslim *ulema*, not without reason, blame for preserving ignorance, superstition, and fanaticism among the Berber tribes. Marabout tribes which live near these shrines claim saintly descent and pretend to a kind of religious nobility.

II. INTERRELATION OF NATIVE GROUPS

A. Morocco

Most Moroccans (about 90 per cent) live by agriculture and herding, or by a combination of the two. Their life is poor and circumscribed, and home industry supplies the minimum foreign goods they require: cotton textiles, tea, sugar, kerosene, and candles. Three-fourths of all farmed land is owned by Europeans, and two-thirds of that by the French.[23] The vast majority of the population is ignorant of and unconcerned with the national fortunes.

City dwellers, among whom Arabs predominate, engage chiefly in trade. The Jews and some Berbers (those of Sūs) maintain small industries (gold-working, embroidery, leather goods, etc.). Fez, many of whose citizens are Jews converted to Islam, has a monopoly of the Moroccan controlled import trade, hence there are colonies of Fāsis to be found in all important centers. Trades in the cities are organized after the old guild plan *(ḥanṭah)*, each supporting its own workshops and stores on a single street. Guild warehouses are known as *funduqs*.

The Arabs regard the Berbers as an inferior people culturally and, as such, fit subjects for suppression and exploitation. Arabs resent the Berber influence with the French regime in Morocco and are out to reduce it. The Berbers, for their part, have a hearty dislike for the Arabs, and the French have put this to good use by using Berber troops to quell Arab uprisings.

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[23] *Enciclopedia Italiana*, XXII, 395 ff.

In French Morocco the Berbers[24] predominate in the Rīf, in the various chains of the Atlas, in Sūs, in the valleys of Wādi Nūn and Drāʿah and in the oases. Their principal groupings are:

1. In the Lower Mulūyah
2. In the Rīf
3. The Barābar (South-central Morocco, southeast of the Grand Atlas.)
4. The Shilḥah, in the southwest
5. Oases (Farfilelt, Figig, Twāt). The Ḥaraṭīn are their serf class.
6. Saharan Berbers

The old Berber tribal system is in a state of progressive decay. Old tribes have broken up into small groups, tribes or sub-tribes, which form confederations or dispute the preeminence among themselves. The old tradition of geneological relationship between the various tribes has been almost completely forgotten. The sedentary population is scattered in cities, villages, and hamlets. The hamlets are inhabited by *ikhs*, or family groups, which are governed in a patriarchal fashion. Relationship is through the father's side; this is important to remember, since it means that even though a person be born of a slave or negro mother no stigma can be attached to it. The most striking feature of Berber life is the dichotomy between male and female society: they form in fact two separate societies, each with its own traditions, beliefs and vocabulary. The men at least outwardly observe the laws of Islam, but the women remain attached to magic and superstition. This magic which is practised by the women has two sources: it is in part a survival from very ancient practises, probably going back to Punic and Carthaginian times, and partly of more recent Islamic origin. Still, the position of women is better than among the Arabized tribes of the North, where they are held in a state of semi-servitude and are much more restricted under the conservative Islamic attitude which prevails.

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[24] Robert Montagne, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

Social classes include:

1. Marabouts, or local saints. They live about the tomb of an ancestor in small, self-governing groups. They hold the best lands, and in the South form one-fifth to one-tenth of the total population.
2. Shurafāʾ (Fr. Chorfa), or "nobles", plural of Sharīf. Most families pretending to Arab origin claim to be descended from the Prophet.
3. The *ʿammah* (Ar.= *hoi polloi*), or mass of autochthones, into which foreign elements have been absorbed. They are divided into confederations, tribes, fractions, and sub-fractions.
4. The Ḥaraṭīn, who are most numerous in the valley of Sūs and especially the Upper Drāʿah and Dades. Their origin is disputed; they are perhaps a cross between

the ancient black population of the Sahara and Sudanese slaves, brought in by Berber conquerors or by the Sultans. They are mostly smiths and artisans. They gradually enter the *ʻammah* and are absorbed in it.

5. The Jews are the most despised class among the Berbers, but they too eventually find their way into the *ʻammah*. Numerous Berber tribes of Islamized Jews exist in the anti-Atlas and the Upper Drāʻah.

Other subject elements in the population are the Shilluḥs or Shilḥah, inhabiting the country south of Mogador and Marrākesh. The Shilluḥs of Mogador are confined to inferior trades and are hardly citizens in the true sense of the word. Among the Saharan Berbers, the Zenaga were subjugated by the Arabs at an early period, and now the word "Zenaga" has become almost synonymous with "serf."

Jews:[25] There has been a Judaizing of Berber tribes from the seventh century on. Throughout history, the position of Jews in Morocco has not been enviable. Wars against France and Spain (1844-1859) gave occasion to persecutions in Mogador and Tetuán. After persecutions in 1863 and 1864, Sir Moses Montefiore went to Morocco and succeeded in getting an emancipation edict from the Sultan; this was ratified by Mūlāy Ḥassān in 1873 and by the Conference of Madrid in 1880. Still the Jewish situation remained bad. Jews were confined to the Mellāḥs, or ghettos, and were subject to vexatious sumptuary and economic restrictions. This situation lasted up to the end of Moroccan independence. The plundering and destruction of the Mellāḥ (Ghetto) of Fez in 1912 was the result of the accusation that Jews had, by their international connections and schools, brought the Europeans into the country. Their lot has been better under the French and Spanish protectorates. The cream of Jewish society in French Morocco consists of foreign Jews who are connected with the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the French Government. There are many descendants of renegade Jews among the Muslims, but the Muslims of old families are suspicious of them and do not mix freely with them.

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[25] See *Júdisches Lexikon* (Berlin, 1939), art. "Marokko."

The *American Jewish Yearbook*[26] reports that in Tangier 12,000 Jews have been affected by the annexation of that territory to Spain. The same source, quoting the Jewish paper *Forward* (June 16, 1940), speaks of the difficult refugee situation at Tangier. On August 4, 1939, there were 800 refugees of Jewish origin there. Two hundred and eighty-five were being supported by the local relief committee; of these, 220 were Poles (coming via Italy), 165 orientals from Rhodes, 150 Italians and Hungarians, 75 Austrians, 30 Germans, and 201 Czechs. In August, applications for aid from 200 to 300 Jewish families from Rhodes had to be refused for lack of funds. A committee was being formed of prominent Frenchmen, Englishmen, and others to study the possibility of establishing new industries for about 1,000 émigrés. Six refugee physicians had been licensed to practise in the International Zone.

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[26] Vol. 42 (1940-41), sect. "Near East:"

The same *Yearbook* states that agents imported from Spanish Morocco attempted to circulate Nazi anti-Jewish propaganda in Algiers in September 1939. These were promptly arrested, and local Muslims expressed their intention of living on good terms with the Jews.

It can be said *in fine* that the Arab throughout his history has harbored an antipathy toward the Jew, an attitude which he has inherited from the Koran along with his religion. In Morocco, as throughout the Arab world, anti-Jewish propaganda from whatever source will always find a large and receptive audience.

Slavery, although illegal, continues on a reduced scale, compared to what it was before 1912. The word "slavery" has acquired with us a connotation which is misleading when we consider the institution in the Arab world. Compared with Christian slavery, Muslim slavery is on the whole a very humane institution. It is even in a way a socially constructive phenonmenon which aids in preventing color-prejudice in Muslim society. The Arabic word for "slave" (*ʻabd*) is synonymous with "Negro."

B. Tunisia

The divisions of Tunisian social life are not so much according to class as to habits of living. The classes are:

1. Urban
2. Fellahin (peasant)
3. Semi-nomadic
4. Nomadic

There is no special slave class. Negroes have in the past been used as slaves, but they have intermarried with the whites and do not now form a class apart.

Algeria

1. Sedentary population: The easy-going city inhabitants, who have for centuries occupied the coastal towns, are different in character from the population of the tribal villages, or Quṣūr. The inhabitants of the Quṣūr, of Kabyle villages are of Berber or mixed Berber stock, as are the fellahin. These latter hold their land in common, the occupant enjoying only the usufruct. The French Government has tried to introduce the idea of individual ownership, but with only partial success. The Kabylian Berbers are ruled by patriarchical landowners, who are agriculturalists and keen individualists. These Berbers provide the transient labor supply of Algeria.
2. Nomads: These are divided into three groups:
   a. Those who wander over a restricted area on the edge of the Tell (coastal region).
   b. Those who have summer and winter habitations, but close to each other. In winter they are found in South Algeria and north of the Saharan Atlas.
   c. The Great Nomads, who spend the winter in the Sahara and the summer in the Tell. Nomad society is patriarchal, with the family as its basis. Polygamy is

not generally practised.[27]

D. Occupations and Industries: Labor in Mines and Factories:

Tangier:

The chief industry is the catching and preserving of fish for export.[28] The tourist trade is very important in normal times, with native crafts third on the list.

French Morocco:

In the mountainous regions there are no real rich or poor. Each Berber has a flock of sheep and goats and cultivates lands which enable him to live.

The Upper Atlas is almost without local industry. But in the Anti-Atlas and Sirwa there are several centers of activity where poor local iron and copper ores are smelted and worked. Guns, knives, and jewelry are made. Most of these centers are in a state of decadence because of European competition. In the plains, there are greater differences between rich and poor, and the wealthy possess gardens or fields which are cultivated by the poor.[29]

The sedentary Berbers of Sūs do not have collective land ownership. In the plains of the northern Gharb and Central Atlas there are, however, communal lands, since these regions have only recently been conquered. In most of the independent *Taqbilts* of the Haut-Atlas there are collective magazines or storehouses in which each family keeps its grain supply.

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[27] *Encyclopédie de l'Islām*, art. "Algérie."
[28] *Isis* on Morocco, Nov. 1940, p. 35-36.
[29] Montagen, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-48.

The chief native industries[30] are therefore the raising of sheep and goats, and agriculture. The phosphate and iron mining industries employ considerable amounts of native labor, but recent figures on the number of employees are not at hand.

The following table is based on a census of establishments run *on European lines* only, as of 1931.[31]

TABLE III

Category	*Personnel*			
	French	*Foreigners*	*Moroccans*	*Totals*
Fishing	1	3	4	8
Forests	77	34	3963	4074
Agriculture	6003	1031	43712	50746
Processing industries	158	149	1922	2229
Food industries	535	302	2485	3322
Chemical industries	114	31	401	546
Rubber, paper, cardboard	72	33	135	240
Book industry	152	50	190	392
Textile and vegetable fibre	130	60	4964	5154
Clothing, working of textiles, feathers, and straw	523	576	620	1719
Leather and hides	104	61	386	551
Wood industries	390	330	872	1592
Metallurgy and metal working	1140	415	1308	2863
Precious metal and precious stone working	10	3	23	36
Terracing and stone construction	1100	1076	12915	15091
Pottery, lime-burning, etc.	43	88	807	938
Transport and maintenance	890	150	1348	2388
Food trade	2341	828	3181	6350
Various businesses	4047	1309	4386	9741
Banking, insurance, various agencies	1020	180	412	1612
Totals	18,850	6,708	84,034	109,592

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[30] See Victor Piquet, *Le Maroc, géographie--histoire, mise en valeur* (Paris, 1918) pp. 92-106.

[31] France, *Annuaire Statistique*, **1936**, p. 327.

In 1933 the coal mines of Jerada employed 600 natives and hoped to double this figure in 1935.

In 1922-33 the phosphate mines of Kuriga supported a permanent population of 20,000 natives.[32]

In Spanish Morocco industry is of little importance.[33] The iron mines must employ a certain amount of native labor, but how much we do not know. In 1937, out of a total production of 1,310,700 kilos of iron ore, 1,271,800 were exported, and over half of this went to Germany.

Tunisia:

Tunisian industry is on the whole concerned with arts and crafts. The principal products are: Fancy textiles (chiefly made by women), leather, and copper goods. These craft artisans are organized into guilds, but the total number of masters and workers in 1930 was only 4,630.[34] The depression of 1929 following had a very bad effect on these native industries, and the present war has given them a further serious setback. Since 1937 the French Government has organized cooperatives for marketing the output and securing raw materials, and is hoping to turn some of the crafts, at least, into suppliers of staple goods, like shoes for the home market; the shoe industry produces 600,000 pairs yearly but has been hit by the lack of heavy sole leather, which is not produced in Tunisia. The Bedouins live chiefly off their flocks, but make an added income by harvesting esparto grass from October to April, and this income is an important item on the family budget.[35] Commercial activity is chiefly trade in sheep and goats, for which Sīdi bu-Zīd, Gafsa, Sened, and Maknassi are among the chief markets.[36] The French have apparently discouraged development of native industry as a whole for fear that it might compete with that of France.[37]

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[32] René Hoffherr & R. Moris, *Revenus et niveaux de vie indigènes au Maroc* (Paris, 1934), p. 220-1.

[33] Idem 47 ff.

[34] *Encyc. de l'Islam*, art. "Tunisie."

Mining, chiefly of phosphate, is much more important than industry. This is centered in the controle, or district, of Gafsa, and in the four centers of M'Dilla and Moulares (phosphate), Mellami, and Redayef.[38] Five thousand natives are employed at full production; a few of these, probably not more than 1,000, are foreign Muslims, principally Algerians.

Algeria:

Like Tunisia, Algeria is not a manufacturing country, and such industries as exist are on a relatively small scale. The native leather industry, however, has some importance,[39] but in absence of imports of heavy leathers is, like its counterpart in Tunisia, hampered by its dependence on the light local hides. The chief industry is agriculture, which produces a considerable exportable surplus of vegetables, fruits, and cereals. Of the food-processing industries, milling is probably the most important. There are 1,500 flour mills in Algeria employing 3,600 workmen; the department of Constantine is the center of this activity, with five large mills each possessing a daily capacity of 200-800 quintals of wheat.[40] There must be several thousand natives employed in mining, but no statistics on them are at hand. The chief mineral products are phosphates, of which Germany in 1936 imported 147,346 tons worth 10,314,000 francs, and iron ore, of which Germany bought 539,825 tons valued at 22,673,000 francs. Other important exports to Germany were wool (5,438 quintals, worth 2,060,000 francs) and vegetable fiber (58,912 quintals, value 2,984,000 francs).[41] Owing to her close connection with France, Algeria has been afflicted with the same labor troubles as the metropolis. The majority of Algerian workers, however, are natives who do not understand the workings of trade unions. The dock workers are most highly organized and have been the cause of much labor trouble. They are reported to be lazy and dishonest, and not so trustworthy as the Berber-descended Kabyls. The dockworkers' union has (or had) Communist affiliations. The Communist and related organizations *(Union départmentale des syndicats confédérés, des syndicats des dockers, des tabacs, et des employés de commerce)* as well as the Communist municipal council of Perrégaux, Oran, were suppressed early in the War, but have shown signs of reviving since the Armistice.[42] If Communism succeeds in regaining strength, it could, considering the present state of Russo-German relations, be a source of great trouble to a German-controlled Vichy government. It is probably in realization of this that early in 1940 a decree was issued that all foreign workers in Algeria, including Moroccans and Algerians, must be provided with registration cards.[43]

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[35] *Bulletin d'information de quinzaine de Tunisie*, No. 3, Feb., 1941.

[36] Ibib., No. 3, Feb., 1941, p. 18.

[37] *Tunisie*, No. 106 (Nov. 28, 1940).

[38] *Bulletin d'information de Tunisie*, No. 3, Feb., 1941, p. 17.

[39] *Nouvelles et information d'Algérié*, No. 38, Feb 28, 1939.

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[40] Ibid, No. 35, Jan. 11, 1939.

[41] Direction des Douanes de l'Algérie, *Documents Statistiques sur le commerce de l'Algérie*, Année 1936 (Algiers, 1937), p. 291.

[42] *ISIS* on Algeria, Feb. 1941, p. 13, 113.

E. Ruling Class

Morocco:

The politically and intellectually dominant class is that of the town Arabs. Especially in the cities they have retained many privileges, but only at the expense of outward compliance with the foreign protectorate powers, France and Spain. It should not be imagined, however, that the Berbers are without influence. The chieftains of the great Berber tribes of the Rīf (Fr. Riff) or coastal plain can wield considerable power. Such leaders as ʻAbd-al-Karīm (Abd-el-Krim), chief of the powerful Berber tribe of the Banu-Uriaghel, and his sons have had to be reckoned with both by the Spaniards and the French.

Locally-elected and government-selected heads of tribes control the Moroccan Makhzen or native government under the French. Local leaders try to stay in power, whether under the Makhzen or not. Appointments to the Makhzen are both a bait and a club in the hands of the French.

Southern Morocco is ruled by a few powerful chiefs (*qāʼids*, "leaders," Fr. *caīds*), who nominally hold their authority from the Sultan, though they are actually free to do pretty much as they please.

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[43] *Algeria*, No. 30, Jan. 1940, p. 21.

They continually strive to impose their authority on the smaller chiefs and to increase the number of their tributary subjects.[44] Their authority is much stronger than that of the ephemeral *qā'ids* of the North, who are much more under the thumb of the central government. The tribal masters form a veritable aristocratic and feudal class, and their feuds are apt to throw the whole of Southern Morocco into a turmoil. The democratic tendency is more marked in Rīf, in Kabylia, and in the Aures (Ar. Awrās). The great *qā'id* always has many enemies, victims of his incessant abuses, and there is always considerable intrigue within the family with which the *qā'id* must reckon. The idea of public good is foreign to him; his main object in ruling is to get from his subjects as much as possible for himself and his supporters.[45]

Independent Berber groups in the mountains form "republics," which are ruled by independent chiefs called *amghars*. The most characteristic Berber political unit is the canton, variously called *taqbilt*, *khums*, or *ʿarsh*, from agglomerations of which all Berber states are formed. The canton is usually associated with neighbors to form a tribe or confederation. It represents a considerable force of inertia to the penetration of the Makhzan. The canton is formed of a group of *mudaʿs*, which are groups of hamlets. These hamlets are composed of groups of families, or *ikhs*. Each house contains three or four families, which practise rigorous monogamy.

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[44] For a description of the life and power of a great *qā'id* and the organization of his territories, see Montagne, *op.cit.* p. 341 ff.

[45] Idem, p. 368.

After the death of the father, the sons try to go as long as possible without dividing up the land, which is worked by the family as a unit. Two or three of these *ikhs* make a hamlet, or *tajert*. The council, or *jamʿah*, of the *mudaʿ* usually meets at the mosque after Friday prayers. The council of the *taqbilt* is the essential institution of the small Berber republic, and is markedly oligarchic. This council is headed by a *muqaddam* ("headman"), who is elected by a number of the notables of the community.[46]

Summary of the social situation: The chief lines of cleavage in Moroccan society are between the Arabs and the Berbers on the one hand and the Jews on the other. There can be no question, for example, of an uprising of slaves against their masters or of Negroes against the whites. The precise situation of labor is not clear. Heavy work, such as mining, is done by natives under European supervision. If we are on safe ground in drawing an analogy with other Arab countries, as seems very probable, it would be difficult to rouse the working class by telling them that they are being exploited by their employers. The Arab peasant or laborer has been exploited throughout his history, if not by his own people then by foreigners, and seldom revolts unless conditions become materially so unbearable that he can no longer survive. Each worker would be individually hired and fired.

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[46] The Berber political organization is well described by Montagne, *op.cit.* pp. 121-132, 180, 218 ff.

Collective bargaining and trade unionism are little known in the Arab East. This is accounted for by the lack of large industries and the absence of sustained organizing ability in the Arab. The nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes are subject to no ruling class, since they are governed by their own democratic assembly. Moreover, their interest in politics is practically nil, and they could become a political factor only if they should be united under a strong and militant leadership, such as existed in the days of the Almoravides and Almohades, but this seems to be entirely lacking.

Tunisia:

The town population looks to the educated Muslim intelligensia for its political ideas, which are distinctly Nationalist and Pan-Arab. Trade unionism has in the last ten years made great progress in Tunisia among the laboring class. In 1937 the C.G.T.T. had 187 organizations divided into 8 local unions, with 40,000 members in all, 75 per cent of them Tunisian. The scope of the C.G.T.T. include all phases of Tunisian industry and agriculture.[47]

Algeria:

In Algeria the situation of the population, under urban influence (about 2,000,000) with regard to political leadership is about the same as in Tunisia and Morocco. Among the 4,000,000 "politically undeveloped" Berber and other natives, on the other hand, opinions, if any, are formed by the local marabouts or "holy men." These marabouts are further discussed below under Political Parties. Closely connected with maraboutism is the Berber belief in the coming of the "Master of the Hour" (*mawlā al-sāʿah*) who will come to expel the Christians. This Mahdism has been exploited by agitators since 1830[48] and is always capable of being aroused. Annual festivals and pilgrimages to the tombs of departed saints provide opportunities for the spread of marabout influence.

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[47] *L'Afrique Francaise*, 48 (1938), pp. 61 and 62.

F. Political Parties:

General:

Over all French North Africa are found Nationalist parties which are out to Arabize the Maghrib religiously, linguistically, mentally, and politically. They try to win over the Berbers by convincing them they are pure Arabs. In Tunisia this is the Destour (Ar. *Dastūr*, "constitution") party founded by Mons. Taalbi; it is now split into the Vieux Destour and the Neo-Destour; but the cause of the split is not clear. In Algeria it is the Association des Oulémas Algériens (program: independence of Arab nations, fusion into a North African bloc, entry into an Arab empire), in Spanish Morocco it is the Unidad Marroqui, in French Morocco the Action Marocaine, and in Libya the Comité de défense de la Tripolitaine et de la Cyrenaïque.

Morocco:[49]

The closest approximation to what we conceive of as political parties are the various Nationalist movements in French and Spanish Morocco.

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[48] *Encyc. de L'Islām*, art. "Algérie."
[49] See Mellor, Chapters IX, XII, and XIII.

1. Spanish Zone: All centered at Tetuán.

The Morocco Unity Party, led by al-Makki al-Nāṣiri

Program: (a) to combat influences contrary to strictly orthodox Islam; (b) to combat Berber influence in Morocco. Arabic language to be propagated; (c) to encourage loyalty to the reigning ʿAlid (Fr., Alaouite) dynasty. No foreign rulers, even though Muslim, for Morocco. France and Spain to make their exit as soon as necessary reforms have been accomplished; (d) to carry out a program of social and educational reforms.

It is said that this party has not enjoyed any too great popularity among the Moors owing to its lack of a strong stand against the Spaniards.

Moorish Nationalist Reform Party led by Abd-al-Khāliq Torres. ʿAbd-al-Khāliq is not as able as al-Nāsiri, but is a good speaker and has a great following. This movement seems to be looked on with disfavor by the Spanish Government. It is more advanced in its ideas than the Moroccan Unity Party, though it has a similar program.

Bureau de Défense Nationaliste, directed by Ibrāhīm al-Wazzāni. Began publishing a news sheet in Tetuán on January 10, 1938. Policy: (a) to defend the Moorish cause by all legal means; (b) to reveal and condemn French colonial intentions toward Moors and Islam and to publicize the increasing French atrocities in Morocco.

2. French Zone:

The center of Nationalism here is the Quarawīyīn College at Fez. The movement first made itself felt in the summer of 1934, and was subsequently known as the *Comité d'Action Marocaine*, or Young Moroccan Party. It has cleverly exploited the weaknesses of French metropolitan politics by enlisting the support of the Left Wing politicians in France, and in this it has been very successful. It has built up a formidable organization throughout the Sharifian empire and made its headquarters at Fez. The guiding hand is (or was) that of Mohammad Allal[50] al-Fāsi, aided by ʿAbd-al-Jalīl, ʿAbd-al-ʿAzīz ibn-Idrīs, Aḥmad Sharkawi, Muḥammad Ghāzi, and Ḥassān al-Wazzāni. The French *comité de patronage* included Jean Longuet, Pierre Renaudel, Jean Piot, and François de Tessan. Its program criticized health, educational and municipal reform measures of the French and aimed to abolish the power of the Berber *qā'ids*, as well as to Arabize Morocco.

The movement increased in strength in 1935 and 1936, with the worsening of the economic circumstances. As the result of riots following the arrival of General Noguès, due to Nationalist propaganda among the famine-stricken town mobs, the *Comité* was disbanded by the Government on March 15, 1937. After a short time the same organization was again flourishing, under the title *Parti National Pour la réalization du plan de réformes*. As a result of the activities of this organization, coupled with Nationalist and Republican propaganda from the Spanish Zone and the activities of Palestinian and Egyptian Pan-Islamic enthusiasts and French, Russian, and Spanish Communists, a series of serious disorders started in Meknes, Marrakesh (classical Ar., Marrākush) and Khemisset. On October 22, it became clear to the French authorities that there existed a revolutionary plot with object of establishing a Muslim empire across North Africa, with Allal al-Fāsi as viceroy or *Khalifah* of Morocco. This led to the dissolution of the *Parti* by decree of the Sultan's vizir, or prime minister, on October 27, 1937- Allal al-Fāsi, ʿUmar ʿAbd-al-Jalīl and Muhammad Lyazid[51] were arrested; Allal al-Fāsi was exiled to Libreville in Gabon. Al-Wazzani was taken into custody on October 29. A projected meeting of the *Parti* at the Qarawīyīn mosque was gotten wind of by the authorities and broken up with the aid of Berber troops. Three hundred members of the *Parti* were arrested and a number sent to prison. This vigorous action on the part of the French had a salutary effect and led to the reestablishment of order and the introduction into the Government of a number of reforms.

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[50] The exact form of the name is uncertain in the source.

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[51] Exact form of name uncertain.

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[51] Exact form of name uncertain.

Tunisia:

The Néo-Destour has been the source of considerable trouble to the French in Tunisia. It, along with the C.G.T.T., was involved in the serious anti-French riots at Bizerta in 1937. The French Communist party says these disturbances were organized by foreign agents, tolerated by French complaisance. The ring-leader in this case was Hasan Nūri, and Algerian, who was subsequently tried and deported to Algeria. The Néo-Destour seems to have been involved in treasonable dealings with Italy, and its paper *L'Action Tunisienne* was suspended and the party itself dissolved by the Resident-General on April 12, 1938. But Communism is undoubtedly a seditious influence, and as an example of what can happen to European ideologies when transplanted to Muslim countries, it may be remarked that the class struggle preached by Communists in Algeria has been turned into an anti-European campaign.[52] With the arrival of the Grand Mufti Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusayni in Italy, it may be expected that Nationalist and especially Pan-Arab propaganda from Italy will become very influential in North Africa.

Algeria:

Left wing. The metropolitan French political party alignments are reproduced in Algeria, which has involved an infiltration of Communist and Leftist elements. These found material to work on in the Muslim proletariat, hit by the depression of 1929. The result was a series of strikes between 1934 and 1939.

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[52] *L'Afrique Francaise*, 48 (1938), p. 57-61, 160-63. For an account of the rise of the Destour Movement, see Roberts, *op.cit.*, I, 295-6.

The *Étoile Nord-Africaine* was an outgrowth of this state of affairs. It had its beginnings among Algerian factory workers in Paris in 1924, with the foundation of a party by Misāli al-Hājj under Communist auspices. It soon found itself in trouble with the government. In time it became increasingly Pan-Arab and Nationalist, and was finally disowned by the French Communists. After having been dissolved by the French Government, it reappeared as the *Parti Populaire Algerien (Hizb al-shaʿb al-Jazā'iri)* in 1937, with a half-secular, half-Muslim program. Its Nationalist leanings drew it into collaboration with the Algerian *Ulema* and the Tunisian Néo-Destour. The dissolution of the party by government decree occurred in 1939. *Les Amis d'el-Ouma (Ar. Asdiqā' al-Ummah,* "Friends of the People") is a double of the *Étoile*.

The *Fédération des Èlus Musulmans Algériens* is composed of Muslim members of elected public bodies who are not naturalized French citizens. Their objects are secularist and Westernizing. Their principal representative is Dr. ben-Jalūl. The program includes: Equality of treatment for French citizens and Algerian Muslims and the representation of the latter in the French Parliament.[53] The *Fédération* fell out with the French colonists on this latter point, but was on good terms with the government again in 1938. The party organs are: *al-Maydān* (Arabic) and *L'Entente*.

Right wing. The conservative Nationalists have in practice collaborated with the Socialists and Communists in Nationalist demonstrations and other activities, as a reflex of Socialist-Communist collaboration in France. The Conservative parties generally aspire to the unity of North Africa and the abolition of French sovereignty, whereas the Left looks for closer collaboration with France and demands French citizenship. The separatist features are, however, much more toned down than in Tunisia or Morocco.

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[53] The present French régime is apparently trying to cooperate with the *Fédération,* since the Rabat (French Morocco) newspaper *al-Saʿādah* for April 6, 1941, p. 1, reports that Pétain signed a decree on March 22 of this year appointing four Muslim members from Algeria to the French National Assembly.

The *Société des Oulémas Algériens* (*Jamʿīyat al-ʿUlamāʾ al-Muslimīn al-Jazāʾirīyīn*) was headed by Shaykh ʿAbd-al-Hamīd ibn-Bādis and his lieutenant Shaykh Ṭayyib al-ʿUqbi. It has the aspect of a Nationalist movement on a Muslim basis. Owing to the intensification of the *Société's* pan-Arab and pan-Maghribi propaganda in 1937, the moderates broke away and in 1938 formed *La Réforme Musulmane*. The *Société* is now comparatively quiescent and is concentrating on religious propaganda. Shaykh ibn-Bādis died in 1940. Its organs are: *al-Shihāb* (Arabic) and *La Défense*. *La Réforme Musulmane*, as said above, is a split from the *Société des Oulémas*, whom they considered too political and too hostile to France. They have a program of religious, social, and political reforms. Their organs are: *al-Iṣlāh* (Arabic) and *La Réforme*.

The Marabouts. It is doubtful whether they are formally organized into a political party, but they have certainly acted like one on a number of occasions. Normally they are the bitter enemies of the orthodox *Société des Oulémas Algeriéns*,[54] who are out to break their power, but common xenophobia and Nationalism tend to bring them together on occasion.

III. RELATIONS OF NATIVES TO EUROPEANS

A. French and Spanish Morocco:

The government in both French and Spanish Morocco is of a dual nature, consisting of the native régime of the Sultan, called the Makhzen (also spelled Makhzen, Makhzan) on the one hand, and the organizations of the French and Spanish protectorate powers on the other.

The Moroccan Arabic phrase *bilād al-Makhzan* currently means "all land under effective French rule." It and its antonym, *bilād al-sibāʾ* (unsubdued land), are a heritage from the days of the Sharifian state, whose governmental system the French used as the framework of their administration. Local units, however, tend to break away from the Makhzen and stop paying taxes; opportunity to do so is conditioned by many factors; distance, degree of local economic development or urbanization, local military strength, etc.

The Makhzen is headed by the Sultan, who combines religious with civil authority and is styled *Amīr al-Muʾminīn* (commander of the believers), a title reserved to the caliph in earlier Islamic times. He is chosen from the ʿAlid Fīlāli Sharifian dynasty which has ruled Morocco since 1649. He is assisted by a vizir or prime minister who in the past has usually been chosen from among his favorites. All functionaries of the court are traditionally drawn from the *gīsh*, or mass of Arab tribes living around the cities. In addition, there are three ministries: Interior, justice, and religious domains (*ḥubus*), the last corresponding to the department of *waqfs* in other Muslim lands. The Sultan is represented by a *khalifah* or viceroy at Fez. Marrakesh and Tiznit, but the administrative power is in the hands of the pashas or governors. Order is maintained by the pasha's police; he is also head of the judiciary. There is a *khalīfah* for Spanish Morocco and a *mandūb*, or commissioner, for Tangier. The *khalīfah* is selected by the Sultan from a list of two candidates presented by the Spanish Government.

When France first formally entered Morocco in 1912 the Makhzen had shrunk to almost nothing. Her reconquest of the country for the Makhzen,[55] well begun by 1914, was delayed but not stopped by the World War I. By 1924 virtually all the land of value in Morocco was included in the Makhzen. The crushing of the Rīf (North Moroccan) revolt of ʿAbd-al-Karim in 1926 seems to have signalized the consolidation of the French government in the country.

The relations between the Makhzen and the Ṣibāʾ, are those of the frontier to the hinterland. Any blow that weakens the Makhzen is to the profit of the Sibāʾ. The collapse of the French republic naturally affected both the economic stability and the military occupation of French Morocco.

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[55] Cf. *Larousse du XXe siècle* IV 701 col. 3: "Notre politique consiste à réduire ces derniers (the Ṣibāʾ) au profit du *bilād al-makhzen*."

Furthermore, it has provided a situation whereby Axis propaganda, by stirring up the Sibā', can weaken the central government of French Morocco. Hence the following point must be kept clearly in mind: The actual geographical extent of the *Bilād Al-makhzan* at any given time provides the index to the strength of the French rule in Morocco.

The city government: The *qā'id* of the semi-nomadic Berbers is replaced in towns and cities by the Pasha, who is assisted by a *khalīfah*. His subordinates are (1) the city treasurer, (2) the *muḥtasib*, or controller of commerce and business, and (3) the *amīn*, who has charge of public domains and collects taxes.[56]

There are three types of local government, *viz:*

1. Council consisting of two municipal commissions, one Muslim and one Jewish, whose members are elected by the notables of the community. (Found in Meknes, Fez, and Sefru, where the population is largely native.)
2. Councils of seaport cities. An official decree states that their constitution should be according to the needs and conditions of individual ports. They must be constituted of a certain number of notables,

including foreigners. This system was used in Tunisia (current at least in 1918). Such councils are found in Casablanca, Rabat, Salé, and Mazagan. The members, including Frenchmen, are named by decree of the Grand Vizier.

3. No council at all. Local government is carried on by close collaboration between the *pāshā* and the French regional commander, aided by an officer specially charged with the administration of the city.[57]

The French organization, as has been said, parallels that of the native government. The French Resident General occupies the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Makhzen and must approve all important decrees issued by the Makhzen. He also represents the French Government and is assisted by a delegate as well as by three services: (1) Financial, (2) Economic, and (3) Social.[58] The policy has been followed of using as many natives as possible in subordinate government posts. The native population actually comes in contact almost exclusively with Makhzen officials, which mitigates the feeling of foreign control. The French administrative officials (except magistrates, financial officers, and engineers) were recruited from graduates of the Ecole Coloniale in Paris.[59] The French civil administration is subordinated to the French military administration in the regions of Fez, Meknes, Tāza, Marrākesh, and the autonomous subdivision of Casablanca (Ar. al-Dār-alBaydāʾ); in other regions the civil régime is independent of the military. The military administration is headed by a superior officer or general aided by an information service. The army has its own network of railroads.

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[57] Piquet, pp. 279-81.

[58] Maestracci, p. 82 *ff.*

[59] Roberts, I, 162 *ff.*, 269-71.

Spanish Morocco is the province of a Spanish High Commissioner, but all diplomatic dealings are supposed to be carried on through the French Resident General of Morocco. What the true situation has been since the Spanish Civil War is not clear, but the impression one gets is that the régime is almost entirely military.

Tangier, like Spanish Morocco, is nominally under the jurisdiction of the Sultan, who used to have a commissioner (*mandūb*) there. Tangier was formerly governed by an administrator, who in 1939 was a Frenchman. There was a legislative assembly of twenty-six members, both Moroccan and European; among the latter the Spanish predominated with four members, Britain and Italy following with three each. Since June 14, 1940, the international administration has been replaced by Spanish control.[60]

The effective administration of the Makhzen is confined largely to cities, valleys and plains. The non-urban population is organized into tribes; those submitting to the Government are commanded by a *qāʿid* ("leader," Fr. *caïd*) named by the Makhzen. He collects taxes, levies troops and insures order. Under him are the *shaykhs* of the smaller tribal divisions. In tribes which have not submitted to the Government, political activities are reserved to the *jamāʿah*, or assembly of males capable of bearing arms. The *jamāʿah* controls civil, criminal, and financial affairs. The *shaykh* is elected by the *jamāʿah* as the agent for carrying out its decisions.

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[60] For a description of present conditions in Tangier, see the *Washington Post*, Friday, Dec. 19, 1941, p. 11.

Tunisia:[61]

Tunisia is a Regency, under French protection since 1882. As in Morocco, there is a dual governmental control. The French section is headed by a Resident General, whose duties are similar to those of his counterpart in Morocco. He is president of a Council of Ministers which includes three natives. The Resident General is assisted by a Delegate and by a military cabinet and a civil caginet. South Tunisia, which is sparcely populated is under military rule. Tunisia is divided into five régions (Bizerta, Tunis, Le Kef, Sūs, Sfax), each one of which is divided into a number of "controls civils," nineteen in all. The French *contrôleurs*, or officers over the *contrôles*, are named by French presidential decree (or were, prior to this war) on the recommendation of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. They oversee the native administration, help colonization, and fulfill the functions of French consular agents.

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[61] See *Encyclopedie de l'Islam*, art. "Tunisie."

The native part of the government is headed by Sīdī Ahmad Pāshā Bey, who succeeded to his office in 1929. He is assisted by three native ministers, including a prime minister *(wasīr al-qalam)*, aided by a French Director General of the Interior, and a Minister of Justice, aided by a French Director of Tunisian Justice. The basis of the native territorial organization is a division into thirty-seven *qāʾidates* (Fr. *caïdats*), or "leaderships." The native *qāʾid*, named by decree, has administrative, judicial and financial powers. He is the intermediary between the government and the people. He commands a native gendarmerie and is aided by a *khalīfah*, or lieutenant. Each *qāʾidate* is divided into a number of *shaykhates*, 604 in all, which are under the authority of *shaykhs* named by the government on the recommendation of the *qāʾid*.

In 1922 a system of economic councils was instituted. The smallest unit in this system is the *qāʾidate* council, a local group in each administrative subdivision. These comprise natives only, two from each *shaykhate*. They are economic liaison groups between the Government and scattered local native groups. The next larger unit is the Regional Council (the five regions being Bizertz, Tunis, Ref, Sus, Sfax.) Representation is on the panal plan, with interests rather than individuals or districts forming the basis.

The *qāʾidate* councils have representatives in this. Its functions are solely economic, but they can levy taxes and raise loans. Regional councils include Frenchmen as well as natives. At the head of the system is the Grand Council, with a French section and a native section. It represents and aims at balancing Government, French and native interests. Save for the representatives of the French population, it has no directly elected members and the French form an absolute majority.[62]

Algeria:[63]

Algeria, being a French province, is governed differently from Morocco and Tunisia. The government and higher administration is centered in Algiers and is headed by a Governor-General, who controls also the military and naval forces. Assisting him is a governing council composed of chiefs of various services. There is a superior council, consisting of high officials and delegates of elected assemblies, which collaborates in the preparation of the budget. In addition to this, there is an elected assembly composed of colonists, Arabs, and Kabyls. French citizens were represented in the French Parliament by three senators and seven deputies, and now there are four Muslim delegates to the Vichy National Assembly.

The territorial administrative divisions are two:

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[62] Roberts, I, 297-99.

[63] *Encyclopédie de l'Islām*, art. "Algérie"

civil and military. The civil (the Tell or coastal region and most of the plateau) is divided into three departments: Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, administered on French lines. There are two types of communes: (1) *commune de plein exercice*, in regions where European interests dominate, which have elected municipal councils; and (2) *communes mixtes*, where the natives predominate. They are administered by government-appointed *ḥākims* assisted by a municipal commission aided by native assistants. These assistants are called *qāʾids* in Arab districts and "presidents" (*ruʾasāʾ* ?) in Berber districts. They are named by prefects (recallable by the Governor-General) and serve as intermediaries between French authority and the natives. The military district includes a part of the Saharan plateau. It is under the generals commanding Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. Immediate authority is exercised by native chiefs under the control of officers. There are five mixed military and native communes.

The natives of Algeria are French subjects, but not French citizens. They are under Muslim law, but can become French citizens by submitting to French law. There has been a movement among the Muslims to get the French Government to confer French citizenship on them without their giving up their "personal status" under Islamic law, but this has been vigorously opposed by the French colonists. The natives who are not French citizens possess some political rights, but not all.

B. Military:

French Morocco:[64]

Since the armistice there has been a demobilization of native troops and reservists recruited from among the local French population. Troops have been repatriated from France to Morocco, but most of these have returned unarmed. By far the greatest concentration of strength is on the northern frontier, facing Spanish Morocco.

The army, as far as native troops are concerned, is composed of sedentary Berbers and Arabs, and sometimes has included many Negro troops. The Arab troops are drawn chiefly from the *gīsh* (Classical Arabic *jaysh*, -army), which is composed of the tribes living near the big towns. Like the Berber *goums* (see below), they are recruited by the *pāshā*, or representative of the Makhzan in the cities. They are divided into "thousands" and "hundreds," or smaller units, and are commanded by military *qāʾids*.[65]

As a corollary of the French pro-Berber policy large numbers of Berbers have been introduced into the army, and form the most loyal element among the native troops. These Berber auxiliary troops are called "*goums* (Ar. word, *qawn*, "people, troop, band"). The practice of using these troops was inherited by the French from the old régime in Morocco, and now they are employed in all the armies in North Africa.

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[64] *ISIS* on Morocco, Nov. 1940, pp. 317-19.

[65] Montagne, pp. 368-70

They are volunteers, and it is considered by the natives an honor to be counted among them. In the military districts the number of *goums* or volunteers from a given tribe varies according to the needs of the region. Each *goumier* or trooper draws a monthly wage and has the use of the land upon which he camps, but must equip and mount himself at his own expense. In civil areas, the *gaums* form a kind of special militia under order of the tribal chiefs and commanded by the government. The *goum* of each ***commune mixte*** is 120 horsemen. In Algeria the infantry includes native ***tirailleurs*** in addition to the *goums*.

The Berbers, however, are attracted to fighting for its own sake and will serve whatever individual or party offers the best prospects of reward. For example, it has been said that large numbers of the so-called "Moorish" troops used by Franco in the Spanish Civil War were in reality Berbers recruited from French Morocco. The French, though aware of this anomalous situation, were apparently unable or unwilling to stop it.[66]

C. European Settlers and Businesses

Spanish Morocco:

Practically no colonization existed in Spanish Morocco before 1927. In 1930 there were only 21,193 hectares either cultivated by Spaniards or owned by them.[67]

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[66] Mellor, p. 162-3.

[67] V. Ruiz Alleniz, *Monografía sobre colonizatión rural en Marruecos español* (Madrid, 1930), p. 146.

French Morocco:

In 1936 there were 139,131 French citizens in the country and 50,937 foreigners, settled chiefly at Casablanca and Rabat.[68] It is difficult to say what proportion of the French can be considered as agricultural settlers, but the number must be fairly large. Their arrival has created a situation similar to that in Palestine, and if exploited by foreign propaganda this could become very acute. French colonist-farmers undoubtedly have increased the agrarian wealth of Morocco with their better methods, but the Berbers (the leading agricultural element) whom they displace tend to drift to the cities and become a part of the floating proletariat which frequently provides good soil for the sowing of foreign propaganda. These displaced farmers undoubtedly on the whole receive a fair price for their land as it is, but they cannot fail to notice eventually the disparity between this price and the value of the land when developed by more capable hands.[69]

There are two kinds of colonists: "official", aided by the Government, and "private", receiving no official aid. In 1925 the nominally Europeanized area was about 1,400,000 acres. Of this total, about 950,000 were "private" and 450,000 "official". The rate vastly increased under Resident General Steeg; he distributed about 150,000 acres to colonists in two years (as of 1927). By 1930, Europeans had taken land equalling from one-fourth to one-third of the sown area. Beginning in April, 1927, high quality land expropriated between 1927 and 1931 amounted to over 300,000 acres. In one instance a considerable fraction of a tribe was expelled to make way for a colonization center. The excuse given for getting the best lands into French hands was that the country would be better exploited and more prosperous. Fraud and sharp dealing were used to get land from the natives.[70]

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[68] *Annuaire Statistique*, 1938, p. 277; cf. Maestracci, p. 81-2.

[69] Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade: *Morocco* (1930), p. 7; Maestracci, p. 92 ff.; Mellor, p. 167-68.

Commercial and industrial activity is dominated by the French, who have provided nearly all the capital now used in exploiting the natural wealth of the country.[71] The phosphate industry is the best illustration of this.

Tunisia:[72]

Most foreigners live in the controle of Tunis, and Ferryville is an entirely European city. Italy's subjects have always had a special position in Tunisia. She has developed her influence by means of the press (newspaper *Unione*), banks, and cultural institutions, which are not subject to French control. The Italians are not subject to the French naturalization law, and are more numerous than the French.

Owing to the lack of French emigration to Tunisia, France since 1921 has adopted a policy of naturalization for foreigners and natives. Naturalization becomes automatic in the second generation (but can be declined), and obligatory in the third for foreigners domiciled in Tunisia.[73]

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[70] Melvin M. Knight, *Morocco as a French Economic Venture* (New York & London, 1937), p. 158-68.

[71] *Journal des économistes*, p. 108 (1938), 447.

[72] The history of European colonization in Tunisia is given in Roberts, I, 271-81; for foreign population see *idem*, 285-96.

The French and Italians are mostly engaged in viticulture. Out of 50,000 hectares of vineyards in Tunisia, the contrôle of Tunis has 23,000, of which the French own 12,000 (637 owners) and the Italians 11,000 (1,010 owners). In the contrôle of Gambolia, out of 20,000 hectares, 6,000 are owned by 147 Frenchmen and 13,000 by 623 Italians.[74] In the Gafsa contrôle, centers of colonization are: Maknassi, Sīdī-bu-Zīd. In the former, there are five French colonists having estates of 1,500 to 5,000 hectares; in Sīdī bu-Zīd there are fifteen French colonists holding 25,000 hectares.[75] In the whole northern Tell region (between the Algerian border and the Gulf of Tunis) the French own ninety-two per cent of European-owned land, but represent only forty per cent of the European cultivators.[76]

Algeria:

In 1936 there were in Algeria 987,252 Europeans, of whom 853,209 were French either by birth or by naturalization. Spaniards were the next largest element with 92,377, and Italians third with 21,000.[77] European colonists occupy about 5,900,000 acres of land. There are 800 European villages, 70,000 European landowners and 300,000 European farmers or agricultural workers.[78] The chief difference between the native and the French colonists has been on the point of granting French citizenship to Muslims without the Muslims' giving up their "personal status" or Islamic law. This has been violently opposed by the colonists, doubtless because they feel it would prejudice their favored position in the country.

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[73] Encyclopédie de l'Islam, art. "Tunisie."

[74] Vidal de la Blache and Gallois, *op. cit.*, XI, 235.

[75] *Bulletin d'information de quinzaine de Tunisie*, No. 3, February 1941, p. 18.

[76] *Geographie Universelle*, XI (Paris, 1937), p. 231.

[77] *Annuaire statistique* (1938), p. 249, 259.

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[78] *ISIS* on Algeria, Feb. 1941, p. 9; gives the number of Spaniards as 100,000, but the rest of its figures agree with those of the *Annuaire Statistique* for 1938. The history of the movement of French settlers and of colonization is given in Roberts, I, 195-204, 215-30. For the growth and character of foreign population until about 1921, see *idem*, 230-38.

IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Contact with the Greater Muslim World

The Tunisians are not in what might be called close contact with the rest of the Muslim world. Only the upper classes can afford to travel abroad, and as far as can be ascertained even this is limited.

There is more contact between Algerians and other parts of the Arab world, but the contacts are fairly close only within North Africa. One of the chief meeting places for Algerians and other North African Arabs in the University of Paris, where students from all over the Maghrib meet and exchange ideas.

B. Pan-Arabism

Morocco:

It is more accurate to speak of a Pan-Arab rather than of a Pan-Islamic movement in French and Spanish Morocco. Arab aspirations everywhere have been stimulated by Egypt's acquisition of her independence, and the disturbances in Palestine have served as a constant irritant. Pan-Arabism makes itself felt most strongly in troubled times, especially in times of economic depression. Agitators tried to take advantage of the troubled conditions in Morocco created by the Spanish Civil War; Pan-Arab enthusiasts from Palestine, Egypt, and Syria were involved in the riots of 1937, as were Spanish Republicans and Nationalists and Russian, French, and Spanish

Communists. However, the total effect of Pan-Arabism in Morocco for some time to come will probably not be very great for a number of reasons:

(1) In the first place, Morocco is definitely a backwater of the Muslim world (it is so regarded by other Arabs) and has no such close contact with the Arab states of the eastern Mediterranean as those states have among themselves.

(2) Secondly, the Pan-Arab movement can appeal only to a fraction of the population. The educated town Arabs constitute the class for which it has the greatest attraction, and in case of bad economic circumstances these might stir up the more apathetic and ignorant Arab element. It is hard to see, however, how the Berbers, with their dislike for the Arabs, could be interested in this cause, and without their support Morocco could never present a united Pan-Arab front.

(3) Finally, the whole movement suffers from lack of unity and leadership. As can be seen from a perusal of the platforms of the various nationalist movements in French and Spanish Morocco, which are given above, their rather reactionary outlook savors more of Muslim puritanism than Pan-Arabism. On the whole, it can be said that "Pan-Arabism" in Morocco is primarily concerned with local Arab supremacy over both Berbers and Europeans.

There have been a few attempts, especially on the part of Spanish Moroccan leaders, to cultivate cultural ties with Egypt, which of all Arab lands has the strongest influence on both French and Spanish Morocco. Information on the progress and development of these connections is not at hand. According to the BBC, the Arab national movement, favored by the young intellectuals, has in recent months been gaining ground in both French and Spanish Morocco. This is undoubtedly the result of Axis stimulation.

In Spanish Morocco, there is a feeling among the Nationalist parties that Spain has let them down. Spain's broken promises are exploited politically by these parties. They want Ceuta and resent the occupation of Tangier; they say it is Germany, not Spain, that wants Gibralter.

Tunisia:

Since Pan-Arabism is so closely connected with the ideology of the various political parties, much of what there is to say about the influence of Pan-Arabism in Tunisia has already been said in that section. There is scarcely an Arab political party in North Africa in which Pan-Arabism and its sister Nationalism does not play an important rôle. Pan-Arabism makes, however, much more of an appeal to the old-line Muslims, students, and intelligensia than to the more strongly Berber working classes. To illustrate: the *Vieux Destour*, composed principally of conservative Muslims and students, has been strongly anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish, but Mons. Bourguiba (a Berber), head of the C.G.T.T. makes a clear distinction between Judiaism and Zionism, claiming that no Tunisian considers Palestine to be his homeland.[79]

Algeria:

There has been a gradual growth of the influence of Pan-Arabism in Algeria since 1931, when the *Société des Oulémas Algériens* was founded, as an aftermath of the Islamic congress in Jerusalem. Prior to that date, Muslim opinion considered Algeria as lost to Islam. Educated Algerian Muslims were impressed by Egypt's acquisition of her independence and Syria's prospect of it, and at the same time were watching closely the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine. All this is reflected in the character of the *Société des Oulémas*: it is primarily puritan, inspired by Muslim reforms in Egypt, and possibly by Wahhabism, and is out to remedy abuses in Algerian Islam; this is the reason for its hostility to the marabouts. It is anti-French and strongly anti-Jewish. This last trait is undoubtedly traceable to the founders' experiences in Palestine rather than to any Arab-Jewish problem at home. One of the most important channels through which the Pan-Islamic doctrine has been spread is the mosque. The *ulema* in 1933 came into open conflict with the French authorities over the misuse of the mosques for this purpose.

There can be no doubt that the Pan-Islamic movement has tried to apply certain techniques borrowed from fascist ideology. One of the characteristics of the movement in Algeria is that it plays up pseudo-historical connections between Algerians and Hannibal's Carthaginians, having in mind the opposition of Asiatics to Europeans.[80] The Berber intellectuals, on the other hand, think the future of Algeria lies in adopting Western ways, according to the *L'Afrique Francaise*.[81]

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[79] *L'Afrique Francaise* 48 (1938), p. 63-4.

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[80] *ISIS* on Algeria, Feb. 1941, p. 10-13; *L'Afrique Francaise* 48 (1938), 196-97.
[81] 48 (1938) 194 *ff*.

V. PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING FOREIGN POWERS[82]

A. Germany in Morocco: French and Spanish Zone: French Zone:

ISIS claims that it is impossible to give an accurate estimate of the success of German propaganda, but the BBC has admitted that the German radio propaganda is vastly more successful than the British. Britain lost prestige by the failure of the attack on Dakar, but this has been at least partially offset by Germany's failure to invade Britain.

Spanish Zone.

Many Spaniards have felt that Spain is bound to enter the war on Germany's side eventually. The local authorities are pro-German, but many of the lower army officers and civilians are strongly pro-British. After the installation of General Asensio as High Commissioner there was a general toning down of pro-Axis extremists, and the Spanish authorities have prevented the Germans from smuggling Nazi propaganda leaflets printed in Arabic into the Spanish Zone. Native opinion is strong only among the educated town class and hardly exists among the primitive tribes. The ruthlessness and power of the Germans are admired, but there is no desire to be ruled by them. Germany is disliked because she is regarded as the power behind Spain, which is not popular; this lack of pro-German sentiment among the natives exists despite the active dissemination of German propaganda. The chief immediate factor in determing the native attitude in Spanish Morocco is the

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331 ff.

existing severe food shortage, and the natives appear not to be convinced by German propaganda blaming this on the British. Both Germany and Spain have been trying to influence the *khalīfah* of Spanish Morocco, but they have been working separately, not in concert.

French Zone:

Little is known of native feeling in French Morocco since the people are under firmer control, and the situation is apparently more stable than in the Spanish Zone. It is said that the Sultan is working with the French authorities, but favors resistance to Germany. German propaganda in the French Zone has been regarded as more thorough and successful than that of Britain.[88]

Tangier:

The BBC currently reports growing feeling against Germany in Tangier following the Spanish occupation of the International Zone. This is because the Spanish occupation and accompanying growth of German influence have brought with them a food shortage.

B. Morocco--Feeling About Britain: French and Spanish Zone:

The Monitor Service and BBC currently quote Zeesen, Rome, and Berlin Radio as reporting Moroccan leaders and newspapers to be expressing a definitely pro-Axis, pro-Vichy attitude, while at the same time severely criticizing Britain and the United States. German propaganda via Vichy can be seen at work here.

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[88] It should be remembered, however, that recent victories in Libya have greatly added to the prestige of Britain in the Arab world and to the effectiveness of her propaganda.

Spanish Zone:

Spaniards show an interest in British propaganda photos and Spanish BBC bulletins exhibited in the Tetuán British Post Office. Spanish non-commissioned officers have requested the British Consol in Tetuán to supply illustrated papers for the Spanish troops. The food shortage is causing great unrest among both Spaniards and Moors, but the blame is put on the Spanish Government, not England. Among the natives, especially the urban classes, Britain is less respected than Germany because of her apparent weakness. The urban population, however, realizes that its freedom would be greater in the event of a British victory. Further growth of pro-British feeling is hampered by the perplexity felt as to why Britain does not allow Morocco to get food and necessities.

French Zone:

French censors frequently pass the pro-British *Tangier Gazette*. See also the remarks below under Free France.

Tangier:

The political effect of British broadcasts is generally good. The Moors trust English news and listen to it extensively in spite of German propaganda.[84]

C. Morocco--Feeling About Free France:

French Zone:

There was a growing sympathy for the Free France movement, and thus with Britain also, until the Dakar fiasco. The Free French had been favored by the newspaper *La Presse Marocaine*, which was suppressed shortly after Dakar. The BBC thinks there are indications that Free French propaganda has some effect in the French Zone.[85]

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[84] BBC Monthly Intelligence Report, August 21, 1941, p. 3.

D. Morocco--Feeling About the United States: French and Spanish Morocco, Tangier:

Only the educated town classes would have any opinion about the United States, or in fact even be aware of its existence. Owing to her past record in the Near East, there would be a tendency for these Arabs to think well of the United States, but this has to some degree been alienated by the moral and financial support which Zionism has received in the United States. It must be kept in mind that what happens in Palestine affects the attitude of the entire Arab East, not only toward Britain but toward the United States as Britain's chief supporter. A positive Arab reaction to the United States can be expected only in case we take some action which would directly affect their part of the world; a successful United States operation against Dakar, for example, or the sending of American food ships to Morocco would make a very favorable impression.

Tunisia:

It is said the *al-Zuhra* and *al-Nahdah*, the only two [86] dailies in Tunisia, are pro-French; it is, however, a question whether these papers are expressing native opinion or that of Vichy.

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[85] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1941, p. 3. This impression has been corroborated by a recent arrival from Morocco with whom the writer has spoken.

[86] *Bulletin d'Information de Quinzaine de Tunisie*, January 15, 1941, No. 1.

GENERAL REMARKS ON NATIVE OPINION

The outlook of even the upper classes in all of North Africa is rather provincial when compared with that of the same classes in other parts of the Arab World, particularly Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. Definite opinions can be expected only about countries and movements which affect them directly. Owing to the primitive state of political philosophy in the Arab world, it is useless to appeal to Arabs on the basis of democracy against totalitarianism. The only propaganda which will really take hold with them is that which plays on old and established prejudicies. For the Arabs, these are chiefly: anti-Jewish, anti-Berber, anti-foreign (especially anti-European). Any support of orthodox Islam as against modern innovators or persecutors is bound to meet with a good reception. It is a question to what a degree the masses are influenced directly by foreign propaganda; it seems more probably that their opinions are dictated by what their intellectual and political leaders think. There would be no such division among the social classes of Arabs on this score as there exists between the upper and lower class Spaniards in Spanish Moroccc Economic conditions have a tremendous effect in determing the attitude of the Arabs toward any one or anything. If there is a scarcity of food, whichever side can convince the Arabs that the other is responsible will have their support.

None of the material available has anything to say about the attitude of the Berbers to any of the questions discussed above. Since they live by and large in the hinterland, they are less influenced by what foreigners do or say. Little or no propaganda seems to be aimed directly at them, as far as can be ascertained. Their chief antipathy is against Jews and Arabs, and pro-Berber policy of both French and Spanish in Morocco has helped make the Berbers there more tolerant of the presence of foreigners in their country.

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